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Ariel Schvartzman
Ariel Schvartzman
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer with independent items via symmetries
P Kothari, S Singla, D Mohan, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019
292019
The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design
RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
212018
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
J Schneider, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 35:1-35:20, 2016
162016
Optimal mechanism design for single-minded agents
NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 193-256, 2020
152020
Smoothed analysis of multi-item auctions with correlated values
A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 417-418, 2019
152019
The fewest clues problem
ED Demaine, F Ma, A Schvartzman, E Waingarten, S Aaronson
Theoretical Computer Science 748, 28-39, 2018
132018
Approximately strategyproof tournament rules: On large manipulating sets and cover-consistence
A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg, E Zlatin, A Zuo
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 3:1-3:25, 2019
92019
Coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017), 2017
92017
On infinite separations between simple and optimal mechanisms
A Psomas, A Schvartzman Cohenca, S Weinberg
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 4818-4829, 2022
42022
Bounds for the communication complexity of two-player approximate correlated equilibria
YK Ko, A Schvartzman
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 24, 71, 2017
32017
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017)
JR Lee, I Panageas, G Piliouras, Z Allen-Zhu, L Orecchia, T Kaufman, ...
Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2017
22017
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.06545, 2016
22016
Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling
S Assadi, V Kher, G Li, A Schvartzman
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 123-152, 2023
12023
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World
G Aggarwal, A Perlroth, A Schvartzman, M Zhao
arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.02699, 2024
2024
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C Alexandros Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2205.13039, 2022
2022
LIPIcs, Volume 151, ITCS'20, Complete Volume}}
T Vidick, E Goldenberg, CS Karthik, O Paradise, A Schvartzman, ...
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020) 151, 9, 2020
2020
Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design
AS Cohenca
Princeton University, 2020
2020
Selling Partially-Ordered Items: Exploring the Space between Single-and Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
2018
Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Approximate Correlated Equilibria
YK Ko, A Schvartzman
2017
Maximum Cardinality Matchings in Fully Dynamic Graphs
A Radhakrishnan, A Schvartzman
2014
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Articles 1–20